RESIDENTIAL DEMAND RESPONSE PARTICIPATION IN QATAR: INCENTIVE DESIGN, THRESHOLDS, AND HOUSEHOLD HETEROGENEITY

Abstract

Qatar's power system has a structural peak-demand problem driven by residential cooling. Average demand sits near 11.4 GW, but the system load factor is low (0.65 to 0.69), leaving a wide gap between average and peak load during extreme heat. Tariffs are heavily subsidized, and rent-inclusive billing removes the price signal that conventional demand-side management depends on. This raises a design question: can economic incentives work when electricity charges are institutionally invisible to households? The study addresses two questions. First, how does paying the electricity bill relate to believing that non-payment encourages higher consumption? Second, what type and level of incentive (bill discount or fixed cash payment) raises willingness to allow remote control of appliances, and how does this vary by billing arrangement, cooling technology, and household spending? A cross-sectional survey of 1,936 residential consumers in Qatar collected demographic, housing, cooling, and billing data, along with self-reported willingness to participate under both incentive types. Three logistic regressions tested the link between bill payment and (i) the moral hazard belief, (ii) acceptance of remote control, and (iii) unconditional refusal of any demand response option. Billing arrangement showed the strongest association across all three models. Compared with rent-included consumers, direct bill-payers had roughly double the odds of endorsing the moral hazard belief (OR = 2.06, p < 0.01), 63% higher odds of accepting demand response (OR = 1.63, p < 0.01), and about six times lower odds of rejecting it outright (OR = 0.163, p < 0.01). Around 55% of rent-included households rejected every option, against roughly 15% of direct bill-payers, suggesting the main barrier is structural rather than a matter of incentive size. Non-central cooling systems independently raised acceptance (OR range: 1.68 to 3.54), while higher household expenditure reduced both belief endorsement and acceptance. Bill savings dominated as a motivator among willing participants (over 50% of bill-payers), followed by social benefits (over 30%). Demand response feasibility in Qatar is shaped more by institutional billing practices than by incentive levels, suggesting segmented program designs targeting non-central AC systems first, with billing reform as a medium-term lever for broader coverage.

Date of Award	2026
Original language	American English
Awarding Institution	HBKU College of Public Policy