TY - GEN
T1 - Shooting to the stars
T2 - 6th IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018
AU - Sciancalepore, Savio
AU - Oligeri, Gabriele
AU - Pietro, Roberto Di
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/8/10
Y1 - 2018/8/10
N2 - We introduce Shooting to the Stars, in short SttS, a secure location verification algorithm leveraging Meteor Burst Communications (MBC)-the ephemeral, ionized stripe generated by meteors. SttS leverages intrinsic peculiarities of MBC, such as robustness to both eavesdropping and jamming, while also enjoying ease of deployment and secure authentication of the transmitting source. SttS enables the verification of the position of a passive receiver by exploiting the radio reflection properties of ephemeral meteor trails, combined with multiple anchors (N) that can be deployed even hundreds of Km from the receiver itself. We developed a complete theoretical model for our solution-rooted on sound literature and past experimental campaigns-, and fully tested it with extensive simulations. Results show that SttS is highly reliable in guaranteeing position verification, and that it can detect a location spoofing attack even when up to N2 -1 anchors are compromised by an adversary. Finally, it is completely tunable, trading off accuracy with the number of observed trails-for instance, observing just 200 trails enables to correctly classify the the location as valid or not with a 0.99 probability.
AB - We introduce Shooting to the Stars, in short SttS, a secure location verification algorithm leveraging Meteor Burst Communications (MBC)-the ephemeral, ionized stripe generated by meteors. SttS leverages intrinsic peculiarities of MBC, such as robustness to both eavesdropping and jamming, while also enjoying ease of deployment and secure authentication of the transmitting source. SttS enables the verification of the position of a passive receiver by exploiting the radio reflection properties of ephemeral meteor trails, combined with multiple anchors (N) that can be deployed even hundreds of Km from the receiver itself. We developed a complete theoretical model for our solution-rooted on sound literature and past experimental campaigns-, and fully tested it with extensive simulations. Results show that SttS is highly reliable in guaranteeing position verification, and that it can detect a location spoofing attack even when up to N2 -1 anchors are compromised by an adversary. Finally, it is completely tunable, trading off accuracy with the number of observed trails-for instance, observing just 200 trails enables to correctly classify the the location as valid or not with a 0.99 probability.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85052578431
U2 - 10.1109/CNS.2018.8433171
DO - 10.1109/CNS.2018.8433171
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85052578431
SN - 9781538645864
T3 - 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018
BT - 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 30 May 2018 through 1 June 2018
ER -