TY - JOUR
T1 - PriviPK
T2 - Certificate-less and secure email communication
AU - AlSabah, Mashael
AU - Tomescu, Alin
AU - Lebedev, Ilia
AU - Serpanos, Dimitrios
AU - Devadas, Srini
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2017/9/1
Y1 - 2017/9/1
N2 - We introduce PriviPK, an infrastructure that is based on a novel combination of certificateless (CL) cryptography and key transparency techniques to enable e2e email encryption. Our design avoids (1) key escrow and deployment problems of previous IBC systems, (2) certificate management, as in S/MIME, or participation in complicated Web of Trust, as in PGP, and (3) impersonation attacks because it relies on key transparency approaches where end users verify their identity and key bindings. PriviPK uses a new CL key agreement protocol that has the unique property that it allows users to update their public keys without the need to contact a third party (such as a CA) for the recertification process, which allows for cheap forward secrecy and key revocation operations. Furthermore, PriviPK uniquely combines important privacy properties such as forward secrecy, deniability (or non-deniability if desired), and user transparency while avoiding the administrative overhead of certificates for asynchronous communication. PriviPK enables quick bootstrapping of shared keys among participating users, allowing them to encrypt and authenticate each other transparently. We describe an implementation of PriviPK and provide performance measurements that show its minimal computational overhead. We also describe our PriviPK-enabled e2e secure email client, a modification of The Nylas Mail, 2015 email client.
AB - We introduce PriviPK, an infrastructure that is based on a novel combination of certificateless (CL) cryptography and key transparency techniques to enable e2e email encryption. Our design avoids (1) key escrow and deployment problems of previous IBC systems, (2) certificate management, as in S/MIME, or participation in complicated Web of Trust, as in PGP, and (3) impersonation attacks because it relies on key transparency approaches where end users verify their identity and key bindings. PriviPK uses a new CL key agreement protocol that has the unique property that it allows users to update their public keys without the need to contact a third party (such as a CA) for the recertification process, which allows for cheap forward secrecy and key revocation operations. Furthermore, PriviPK uniquely combines important privacy properties such as forward secrecy, deniability (or non-deniability if desired), and user transparency while avoiding the administrative overhead of certificates for asynchronous communication. PriviPK enables quick bootstrapping of shared keys among participating users, allowing them to encrypt and authenticate each other transparently. We describe an implementation of PriviPK and provide performance measurements that show its minimal computational overhead. We also describe our PriviPK-enabled e2e secure email client, a modification of The Nylas Mail, 2015 email client.
KW - Application of key transparency
KW - Certificateless cryptography
KW - Confidentiality
KW - End-to-end secure email
KW - Key agreement
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85019210165
U2 - 10.1016/j.cose.2017.04.008
DO - 10.1016/j.cose.2017.04.008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85019210165
SN - 0167-4048
VL - 70
SP - 1
EP - 15
JO - Computers and Security
JF - Computers and Security
ER -