Abstract
Federated learning-based model marketplaces have the potential to securely leverage healthcare data for efficient healthcare transactions. However, the willingness to participate in this marketplace is severely hindered by self-interested model sellers, who maximize their personal gains via distorting the quality of their models. To this end, we propose a reputation-driven hierarchical incentive mechanism, called PACE, which combines contract cooperation and game pricing to motivate model sellers to be honest, thereby improving the sustainability of the model marketplace via two-layer cooperation. Specifically, at the training layer, we design a reward payment rule based on multidimensional contracts, while at the trading layer, we use a competitive market pricing game to develop the accuracy pricing rule. In particular, the above rules cleverly combine the fine-grained model sellers’ reputations with the willingness of healthcare devices to indirectly affect the model sellers’ utilities. Theoretically, we prove that PACE can effectively incentivize model sellers to truthfully report model quality while satisfying both individual rationality and incentive compatibility with a fairness guarantee. Experimental results conducted on four real-world datasets show that our PACE improves the global performance by up to 12.85% and reduces the global loss by at least 19.23% compared with the state-of-the-art baselines.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1571-1583 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2025 |
Keywords
- Federated learning
- Healthcare
- Incentive mechanism
- Model marketplace
- Smart consumer electronic devices
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