Expressing Dissent: Gag Laws, Human Rights Activism and the Right to Protest

Over the last decade, gag laws have been increasingly used in the context of the right to protest in both liberal and illiberal States. Alarming restrictions include not only laws directly suppressing protests—as in the case of authorization requirements and other prior restraints—but also laws suppressing protests indirectly, in the name of public order, freedom of movement, and other public interests. Drawing on the jurisprudence of human rights bodies, this Article explores whether there is any way to assess the legitimacy of such restrictions vis-à-vis human rights activism and the imperative of political and democratic participation. This Article argues that the only possible criterion by which to distinguish ‘gag laws’ from legitimate restrictions is effectively a functional one, based on the ‘chilling effect’ on the freedom to protest. This author takes the view that gag laws encompass not only legislation imposing prior restraints to freedom of speech or assembly but also all those laws applied in a way that attempts to eliminate dissent and political opposition.