Abstract
In a series of cases decided over the last few years, the European Court of Human Rights has been increasingly vindicating artistic freedom. It has been expanding the meaning of 'satire' as a form of art; excluding the protection of religious sensibilities from the scope of Article 9; and gradually referring to the defence of 'fiction' in literary cases. Yet a more careful analysis of the Court's case law does not suggest that art holds a privileged status among other forms of expression. It rather suggests that the Court, albeit tacitly, operates a certain hierarchy of values: on the one hand, by privileging liberal-and secular-values and, on the other, by being mindful to preserve the States' margin of appreciation in issues touching upon public morality and public order. In this article I submit that the Court could substantially benefit from an explicit consideration of defences for artists and writers.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 511-539 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| Journal | Human Rights Law Review |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 8 Jul 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Article 9 and Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights
- Artistic freedom
- Freedom of expression
- Literary freedom
- Public morality
- Religious sensibilities