Controlled neo-corporatism in disability policy: hybrid governance and institutional resilience in rentier states: hybrid governance and institutional resilience in rentier states

This study examines disability governance in a rentier state context, to determine whether it sustains institutionalization or advances deinstitutionalization. Employing the meso-level Policy Arrangement Approach, the study explores four dimensions – discourse, actors, resources, and rules. Using a corpus of 427 coded text segments analysed through qualitative and computational (R-based) methods, the findings reveal a hybrid governance model – controlled neo-corporatism – where the state retains centralized authority while permitting structured roles for non-state actors in service delivery. The findings identify a “controlled neo-corporatist” model that paradoxically combines state dominance in agenda-setting and resource allocation with structured non-state participation in service delivery and advocacy. This model partially aligns with rights-based framework, but is constrained by institutional resilience. The study rejects the hypothesis of persistent centralized control, supporting instead a transition to hybrid governance driven by global norms and modernization, though full deinstitutionalization remains limited by state-centric priorities. This contributes to comparative disability studies by highlighting unique governance dynamics in rentier states, bridging macro-level policy with micro-level exclusionary outcomes.