TY - GEN
T1 - Beyond Static Signatures
T2 - 19th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, WiSec 2026
AU - Oligeri, Gabriele
AU - Sciancalepore, Savio
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 Copyright held by the owner/author(s)
PY - 2026/6/29
Y1 - 2026/6/29
N2 - Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) has emerged as a promising physical-layer technique for device identification, leveraging the hardware imperfections in radio transmitters. However, the assumption that RF fingerprints are static and persistent is increasingly challenged by recent findings. In this work, we present a comprehensive statistical analysis of radio fingerprint mutations, focusing on the impact of FPGA image reloads in Software Defined Radios (SDRs) when used as both transmitters and receivers. Our results highlight that FPGA reloads cause a subset of devices to exhibit two different persistent fingerprint states, one following a memoryless (Markovian) process and the other retaining temporal dependencies. Notably, we show that proper external synchronization between transmitter and receiver eliminates these fingerprint mutations, leading us to attribute the phenomenon to residual phase and timing errors rather than inherent hardware changes. Our work exposes the necessity of accounting for fingerprint dynamics caused by internal SDR events and synchronization, highlighting the limits of current measurement methodologies and the need for new, statistically robust approaches to physical-layer device identification.
AB - Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) has emerged as a promising physical-layer technique for device identification, leveraging the hardware imperfections in radio transmitters. However, the assumption that RF fingerprints are static and persistent is increasingly challenged by recent findings. In this work, we present a comprehensive statistical analysis of radio fingerprint mutations, focusing on the impact of FPGA image reloads in Software Defined Radios (SDRs) when used as both transmitters and receivers. Our results highlight that FPGA reloads cause a subset of devices to exhibit two different persistent fingerprint states, one following a memoryless (Markovian) process and the other retaining temporal dependencies. Notably, we show that proper external synchronization between transmitter and receiver eliminates these fingerprint mutations, leading us to attribute the phenomenon to residual phase and timing errors rather than inherent hardware changes. Our work exposes the necessity of accounting for fingerprint dynamics caused by internal SDR events and synchronization, highlighting the limits of current measurement methodologies and the need for new, statistically robust approaches to physical-layer device identification.
KW - Physical Layer Security
KW - Radio Frequency Fingerprinting
KW - Signal Intelligence
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105045201032
U2 - 10.1145/3765613.3797445
DO - 10.1145/3765613.3797445
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105045201032
T3 - WiSec 2026 - Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
SP - 239
EP - 249
BT - WiSec 2026 - Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 30 June 2026 through 3 July 2026
ER -